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Information Asymmetry and Power in a Surveillance Society 
 
Abstract 
This paper fuses Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional view of power with the economic 
concept of informational asymmetry to explicate how access to information is organized 
and how power relationships arise from this organization. We argue that many observed 
asymmetries are deliberate and, drawing from the economics and finance literature, we 
posit that their outcomes are inevitably detrimental. The paper examines the techniques 
that foster information imbalances, such as media and propaganda, knowledge 
production, educational systems, legal and organizational structures, exclusive 
information networks, and surveillance. We conclude that in the absence of greater 
transparency, the deleterious effects of unequal access to information will continue and 
deepen. We further suggest that the analysis of the complexities of the issues warrants a 
broad, multidisciplinary approach and we suggest what this might include.   
Keywords: Information Asymmetry; Power; Surveillance; Secrecy  
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1. Introduction 
Over recent years there has been mounting controversy regarding the issues pertaining to secrecy, 
surveillance, access to information and the power relations that arise from it. There are many 
distinct streams in the literature and in this paper we want to bring together two perspectives that 
have not previously been united. First, we wish to start with Lukes’ (1974 & 2005) ‘three dimensional 
view’ which provides a perceptive account of the different aspects of power. Lukes points out that 
both political action and inaction are of equal significance, however as Lukes recognizes, this 
produces problems in that non-decisions are not empirically observable. By focusing on things that 
are not directly measurable, the approach of Lukes can be contrasted with that adopted by 
economists who are only concerned with the manifest. By bringing together two different lenses of 
social theory, we hope to provide a deeper and more nuanced picture. We also introduce a concept 
of ‘information asymmetrification’ to theorize the deliberate withholding and manipulation of the 
knowledge available to the general public.  
Lukes’ takes Dahl’s (1957) ‘Concept of Power’ as the first dimension – described by Lukes as a ‘first, 
rather crude effort’ (1974: 60) – that looks at situations of conflict to see who dominates the 
decision-making. The two dimensional view comes from Barach and Baratz (1970) which served as a 
limited critique of the behavioral bias of the one-dimensional model and covers both decision-
making and non-decision-making.  The latter can be related to suppression of certain political issues 
and making sure that only safe issues are debated in the public domain. Alternative voices are 
suppressed by individuals who have the means to do so. In situations like this, it is difficult to 
establish whether maintenance of the status quo is through consensus or non-decision-making. 
Lukes’ three dimensional approach explicitly rejects the overly-individualistic approach of the first 
two dimensions, drawing in ‘consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of 
politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices’ (p24. Italics in the 
original text).  Through ‘the control of information, through the mass media and through the 
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processes of socialisation’ (p23) the desires of the general public can be molded and any latent 
conflict may be averted. 
The concern over the manipulation of the desires of the many through filtering and contorting 
publicly available information has been with us for centuries. Public support, frequently vital for the 
operationalization of power, can be seen as at least partly a function of the information available. 
Hume recognized this when he commented: 
Nothing appears more surprising […] than the easiness with which the many are 
governed by the few […]. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, 
we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors 
have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that 
government is founded. (Hume, 1742/1987: 11) 
Hume’s concerns resonate with Lukes, and point to a key difference that he establishes from the 
work of Foucault.  Lukes (2005: 98) argues that Foucault’s ideas have launched a voluminous body of 
work that has attempted to solely examine ‘how and to what extent the governed are rendered 
governable’, whereas Lukes’ own concern also remains ‘the significance of the outcomes that the 
powerful can bring about’ (p.111). Although both aspects are undoubtedly important, our focus 
ultimately in this paper is on the creations of those asymmetries by the powerful. 
 This leads to the importance of considering different models of information use. In this paper, to 
theorize some of the more egregious developments, we use the economic concept of information 
asymmetry. Informational imbalances are, it seems, essential in maintaining power, yet the 
economics literature highlights the severe consequences of such imbalances. The theme of 
restricting information is one that has sporadic, but important, interest. One notable author is Innis, 
who introduced the concept of ‘monopolies of knowledge’ (see, for example, Innis (2008)). Innis 
identified that ‘monopolies or oligopolies of knowledge have been built up in relation to the 
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demands of force’ (2008: 32). Heyer & Crowley (2008: xxxiii) note that these structures lead to 
‘overarching political authority, territorial expansion, and inequitable distribution of power and 
wealth.’ Innis, originally writing in 1951, also drew attention to the importance of ‘mechanized 
knowledge as a source of power’ (2008: 195) – yet his insight comes several decades before the 
industrialization of knowledge that information technology would allow. 
Furthermore, Innis (1999) elaborates on the enduring nature of restrictions, pointing out that the 
priesthood in ancient Egypt monopolized knowledge on flood patterns (enabling a degree of 
prediction that reinforced their position) and maintained this through the use of specialized scripts 
(hieroglyphics) impenetrable to outsiders (see also Athwal (2004)). This helped cement a 
monopolization of religious knowledge (Baines, 1990). In Babylonia, the power of the priesthood 
was similarly entrenched, leading to one king constructing a library and archives in an attempt to 
diminish religious authority (Innis, 2008: 99). Athwal (2004) suggests that this is even more clearly 
visible in the mediaeval era where the clergy not only monopolized writing and literacy but also 
were able to define what was legitimate thought and what was heresy. Scientific ideas, later 
embraced as progress, were brutally suppressed. Lukes would probably refer to this as 
institutionalized preference-shaping. History is, of course, littered with similar examples but here we 
set out to look at the present. 
One key distinction between these past examples and today is the price of collecting and storing 
knowledge. When library documents had to be painstakingly copied by scribes, knowledge was 
circumscribed by the resources demanded in its capture. Contemporary technologies allow the 
reproduction and storage of information on an unprecedented scale. Villasenor (2011: Figure 1) 
illustrates how the retail hard drive cost per gigabyte has plummeted over the past three decades. 
This has allowed governments, their agencies, banks and major corporations to collect and keep 
data on our transactions, purchases and communications. This data is often shared between the 
power-players but rarely divulged to the public, empowering the former at the expense of the latter.  
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Much of this data is collected through mass surveillance. However, the concept of surveillance is 
intimately linked with power and this has been theorized in particular by Michel Foucault. We shall 
discuss the notion of the panopticon later in the paper but here we wish to consider how Foucault’s 
idea of power impacts upon our understanding of surveillance. In Foucault’s analysis, power is ‘a set 
of practices which could be specified and which positively produced ways of behaving and 
predispositions in human subjects: indeed the most pervasive power is that which makes its subjects 
cooperate and connive in their subjection to it’ (Hoskin & Macve, 1986: 106). Foucauldian power, at 
its most intense, requires acknowledgement and acquiescence by its subjects. This throws up some 
interesting conundrums with secrecy and surveillance: can and do the subjects recognize their 
position? The scope of governmental untargeted surveillance suggests that many, if not most, 
people may be unwilling and unknowing participants in this particular exercise of data gathering. The 
massive imbalance in knowledge between those who possess the data and the subjects of the data is 
what makes the concept of information asymmetry so important. We shall explore the economic 
and financial ramifications of this in the following section.  
The wide-ranging nature of this investigation cuts across many academic disciplines, including 
finance, economics, sociology, psychology, political science, media and communications. The topics 
covered are perhaps even broader, including education, media manipulation, social structures, legal 
systems, surveillance technologies, and power. Considering the scope of the study, an exhaustive 
literature review becomes close to impossible within the bounds of a single academic paper. Even 
though our references include over 160 items, we only touch upon the wider literature in many of 
these areas. Our intention is merely to sketch the layout of the informational game within society.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the economic and financial 
consequences, and the uneven contours of the informational playing field. Section three examines 
the tools and techniques that are deployed to create, maintain and develop asymmetries in different 
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domains. Section four discusses the outcomes of surveillance and information asymmetries and 
some tentative means of mitigation. Finally, we turn to our conclusions in section five. 
2. Economic and Financial Consequences of Information Asymmetry 
In this part of the paper, we turn to the economics literature, which has had long-standing 
discussions about the importance of information, particularly in cases where access falls short of 
ideal. This analysis takes a different orientation to that in organization studies and has generated 
some significant insights. However, economic studies primarily consider tangible, quantifiable, 
outcomes and, although important, cannot cover the whole spectrum of societal consequences. 
Economics also commonly takes many phenomena (such as informational asymmetry) as pre-
determined, without reflecting on their origins. This approach does allow greater analytical clarity 
but attracts objections from those who only see the limitations in a reductive approach. Therefore, 
later in this paper we shall build upon an expanded understanding when we consider the intangible 
aspects of information asymmetrification, particularly when linked to power creation and 
reinforcement. Here, then we start with consideration of how problems have been discussed within 
the confines of finance and economics before we extend it into other fields. 
One of the early important studies is Simon’s (1957) attempt to resolve the disparity between the 
perfect information assumption of neo-classical economics and what might be seen as ‘real-world’ 
practicalities, which led to important insights such as ‘bounded rationality’ and actors ‘satisficing’ 
rather than reaching the supposedly optimal outcome. Stigler’s (1961) article further detailed the 
problems of ascertaining the market price in the absence of pertinent information, while Arrow’s 
(1969) insight worked a similar furrow, demonstrating how the cost of information has detrimental 
effects in markets.  
Stiglitz’s Nobel Prize-winning work also developed the theme of the impossibility of perfect 
information in neo-classical economics but his analysis spread beyond modelling to suggest that: 
‘information imperfections, and asymmetries of information, are pervasive in every aspect of life 
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and society’ (Stiglitz, 2002: 463). Mostly, he emphasizes the deleterious effects of such imbalances 
and the limited recourses available for correction: ‘Without unbiased information, the effectiveness 
of the check that can be provided by the citizenry is limited; without good information, the 
contestability of the political processes can be undermined’ (p. 488). Akerlof, who shared the 2001 
prize with Stiglitz, is best known for his work on information asymmetries in goods markets. This was 
developed from an examination of how poor quality cars (‘lemons’) were quickly returned to the 
forecourt, driving down the prices of all nearly-new vehicles. In such cases where the seller knows 
more about the product than the buyer, certain market failures and imperfections inevitably 
emerge. 
As Stiglitz pointed out, problems of information imbalance extend both through applied economics 
and beyond. It would be outside the scope of this paper to detail all of the areas where the concept 
has been applied but examples can be seen in labor market studies (see, for instance, Chang & 
Wang, 1996), agricultural economics (Hobbs & Plunkett, 1999), economic psychology (van Dijk & 
Grodzka, 1992), public finance (Parker & Hartley, 2003), or economic behavior and organization 
(Straub & Murnighan, 1995). Running persistently though this literature is the finding that 
information asymmetry has malignant effects on markets and society in general. 
The literature on corporate policies and environment has involved discussion around several areas 
and we highlight some briefly here. Francis et al. (2005) demonstrate that not only does increased 
disclosure of financial information decrease the costs of both debt and equity finance but that where 
there is a need for greater external financing there is a commensurate increase in the level of 
information shared. Glennerster and Shin (2008) show similar forces in play when they reveal that 
governments can effectively lower the cost of their debt by providing more accurate macroeconomic 
information more frequently. Francis et al. (2009) show that corporate and institutional 
transparency run hand-in-hand with delivering more efficient resource allocation and higher growth 
rates. Li and Zhao (2008) suggest that firms that have the highest information asymmetries are the 
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ones that are least likely to pay, or increase, dividends. Indeed, one of the major theories that 
attempts to explain how firms organize their financing – the pecking order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) – rests on the assumption that information asymmetry 
is the key, if not the only, driver (Fama & French, 2005). This asymmetry may also result in firms 
failing to undertake profitable projects. However, in the above-mentioned studies, information 
asymmetry is not seen as something that is necessarily deliberately created. 
Some of this more nuanced emphasis emerges when we consider the stream of literature in finance 
which deals with trades of people with preferential access to information – insiders. According to 
the legal definition, insiders in the US are defined as ‘executives, top executives, members of the 
board of directors, and large shareholders who hold more than 10% of any equity class of securities’ 
(Seyhun, 2000: 68). Although these individuals are allowed to trade in principle, they are prohibited 
from dealing when they are in possession of material, non-public information. All their trades have 
to be reported to the relevant authorities (the SEC in the US) and this accumulated data can and has 
been used for research purposes. Using this resource (which, of course, does not necessarily capture 
illegal, hidden or disguised, trades) Seyhun (p71.) documented that even here those privy to the 
most valuable information are able to generate the largest market-beating trading profits on their 
reported transactions.     
If a market-maker (who is obliged to offer both buyers and sellers a price) suspects that insiders are 
active, they will protect themselves against trading losses by increasing the bid-ask spread (the 
difference between what they will sell and buy a security for). Since the bid-ask spread represents 
transaction costs, any rise diminishes the numbers willing to trade. At its extreme, as Glosten & 
Migrom (1985: 84) point out, there is, ‘the theoretical possibility that markets might close down 
entirely, with the bid price being set so low and the ask price so high as to discourage any trade. This 
problem is identical to the famous lemons problem of Akerlof (1970), in which adverse selection can 
destroy the market. The consequences of insider trading are even more pervasive if unchecked: 
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Bhattacharya & Daouk (2002) demonstrate that companies in countries that do not enforce insider 
trading regulations face a higher cost of capital. Similarly, Manove (1989) illustrates how insider 
trading reduces corporate investment and returns to outside shareholders.  
Manne (1966) attempted to develop a contrasting perspective in arguing that insider trading delivers 
a benefit in the form of more efficient prices as their deals will help move the market towards a 
more accurate level. A number of authors have discounted this notion: Fishman & Hagerty (1992) 
argue that the presence of insiders can discourage other traders from seeking and acquiring 
pertinent information as they are bound to lose in a trade against insiders regardless of their effort. 
Bushman et al. (2005) and Gilbert et al. (2006) show that this discouragement also extends to 
market analysts, who are supposed to collect and evaluate information on behalf of clients. 
Wisniewski (2004) further argues that the net effect of insiders on price efficiency is likely to be 
negligible as any positive benefit is offset by the reluctance of outsiders to engage in information 
processing.  
One could argue that corporate secrecy should be allowed, specifically when it is applied to research 
and development. Famously, Coca-Cola has refused to disclose the recipe for its drink despite a 
court order (see Marcus, 1986: 1605 fn. 1). Companies may be reluctant to apply for patents since 
the process involves disclosure of all documentation pertaining to the innovation, giving competitors 
the chance to begin ‘inventing around the patent’. On the other hand, the failure to apply for patent 
protection effectively allows competitors to reverse-engineer the product and thus also benefit from 
any profits garnered by the innovation. Unsurprisingly, the academic debate as to whether patents 
are an effective substitute for secrecy is fierce and ongoing (see, for example, Arundel, 2001) and is 
unlikely to be resolved soon. The issue is undeniably complex, and as Friedman et al. (1991: 67) 
point out, ‘Every producer of information desires … access to his competitors’ information as well as 
protection of his own’ (see also Landes and Posner, 1989). Often companies will seek to protect their 
secrets through the use of ‘non-disclosure’ or ‘non-compete’ clauses in employment contracts. 
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However, as Marx et al. (2010) show, states that enforce non-compete agreements ultimately lose 
the most valuable innovators as they migrate elsewhere. These considerations point to the need for 
a detailed welfare analysis: one that would quantify the marginal benefits of secrecy (beyond patent 
protection) for the innovation process, and offset these against the marginal costs of impeded 
information-sharing. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and, in the absence of this, 
we remain unconvinced as to the net benefits of secrecy in R&D active firms.    
What comes through from this literature is a conclusive argument from within economics and 
finance that information asymmetry is insidious for both a variety of specific actors and for broader 
society. If there are any benefits, they will be to select minorities, and will be dwarfed by the costs to 
the many. More damagingly, as Stiglitz (2002) pointed out, such imbalances cannot, by their very 
nature, be countered by an informed citizenry. It is our contention that this unevenness is by no 
means accidental and in the next section we examine how it arises, together with a reflection on the 
implication for power distribution. 
 
3. Tools and Techniques for Maintaining Information Asymmetry 
In this section we provide an overview of what constitutes, in our opinion, the principal methods by 
which information asymmetrification occurs within societies. Firstly, we look at how the media, 
particularly through the promulgation of propaganda, skews the information available. When we 
consider knowledge production and transmission in section 3.2, we pay particular attention to the 
design of educational systems and its consequences. The following section examines legal and 
organizational settings, exploring how they promote unequal distribution of knowledge. In section 
3.4, we continue this argument by looking at specific social structures within which private 
information is exchanged. Finally, we turn to issues related to mass surveillance that provides 
unparalleled levels of information access to political leaders and captains of industry. 
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3.1 Media and Propaganda 
Political consensus can be manufactured through control and use of the media apparatus. If 
politicians want to prevent grievances from reaching critical mass, they may attempt to condition 
the populace. As Lukes (1974:23) explicates when outlining his three dimensional view of power, ‘… 
is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them 
to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?’ This can, and 
does, take many forms. 
One extreme is that of totalitarian states – where contorting information, propaganda, 
disinformation campaigns and selective disclosure are the daily staples of political life – the 
underlying principle behind this being that a lie repeated often enough becomes the truth. In 
dictatorships and communist states, governments have absolute control over media outlets and 
institute various forms of censorship to ensure that only appropriate information is circulated. In 
such states the populace has only limited (often illegal) access to alternative voices. Currently, the 
most visibly censorious society is North Korea but its tactics are but a reflection of those of Eastern 
Europe before the fall of communism. Even developing economies, such as China, remain suspicious 
of the possibility of freely sharing information via media such as the Internet and continue to 
monitor usage and suppress access to particular sites (see for example Dann & Haddow, 2008). The 
tactics used by such states are fairly unsubtle and require little elaboration – it is the more diffuse 
systems in developed nations that we would like to turn our attention to.  
Herman and Chomsky (1994) propound a ‘Propaganda Model’ which describes general tendencies in 
the US media. Since freedom of speech, at least nominally, prevents the use of some of the methods 
deployed within dictatorships, the control manifests itself in more subtle ways. Herman and 
Chomsky argue that information presented to the public has passed through five distinct filters. 
Firstly, major media outlets require a government license and, even more importantly, huge (and 
ongoing) capital investments. Consequently, as Herman and Chomsky argue, US media corporations 
13 
 
are controlled either by wealthy families and/or large corporations, acting in their interest. Mirowski 
(2013) takes this further, suggesting that these corporations and individuals are willing collaborators 
with a specific set of political and commercial agendas. The most egregious example of where media 
power and politics intersect is probably that of Berlusconi’s Italy. Largely driven by his near-
monopoly of national television and media, he was elected as Prime Minister four times (Statham, 
1996). Not only was he effectively free from sustained criticism but he was able to vigorously defend 
his perspective.  
The second filter for Herman and Chomsky is related to the economic power of advertising. Since 
media outlets are so dependent upon advertising revenue, they are driven towards attracting 
specific customer demographics and try to avoid antagonizing the advertisers – typically large 
corporations. The third filter also links economics and information – governments and corporations 
spend a vast amount of resources in developing ready-to-use media stories and many journalists are 
reliant upon them to provide their copy. Since questioning the veracity of the source may result in 
future supplies being curtailed, it is easier to simply repeat the supplied version. Fourthly, media 
organizations seek to minimize ‘flak’ – the risk of lawsuits, petitions, audits or coordinated attacks 
from powerful interest groups. Finally, in the US context, there is a strong ideological undercurrent 
of ‘anti-communism’, where communism is taken to be anything that runs counter to the needs of 
large corporations. 
The link between power and the type of information disseminated by the media has been oft 
remarked. Herman and Chomsky (1994: 32) suggest that, ‘propaganda campaigns have been closely 
attuned to elite interests’ including political and commercial developments, and the diversion of 
attention from increasingly skewed distribution of income. Heyer and Crowley (2008: xxxv) note that 
Innis identified that, ‘The properties of the dominant medium, along with the pre-existing 
institutional structure, facilitate knowledge, and therefore power, being localized in such a way that 
it serves particular interests and is always beyond access for a large segment of the population.’ 
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Bennet (1988: 178-179) is of similar opinion: ‘Leaders have usurped enormous amounts of political 
power and reduced popular control over the political system by using the media to create support, 
compliance and just plain confusion among the public.’ Mirowski (2013) even coins a word to explain 
this – agnatology – whereby competing arguments are deliberately sown in order to ensure that the 
population is endlessly confused and thereby easily manipulated.  
Alternative sources of information are available, but are often excluded from mainstream 
discourses. Even where they threaten to break through (such as with the Guardian’s revelations 
arising from the Edward Snowden leaks), there is a relentless campaign to discredit both source and 
outlet in order to re-establish the status quo. These days, the trade of the investigative journalist is 
ever more dangerous – the Committee to Protect Journalists notes that over 1,000 have been killed 
since 19922. But, as Herman and Chomsky’s analysis would suggest, the investigative journalist is 
also threatened from within as many media outlets now no longer desire the services of individuals 
that might destabilize corporate financial and political interests.  
3.2 Knowledge Production and Transmission 
Lukes (1974) recognizes that one of the ways in which potential conflicts are averted is through the 
use of the education system. Citing Dahl (1957), he refers to ‘some degree of indoctrination through 
the schools’ (p23.) as ‘leaders … shape preferences’ in line with their objectives. This means that 
what is presented as ‘knowledge’ is frequently contested. In the UK, Michael Gove has kick-started a 
vigorous debate as to what should constitute the history syllabus (Ferguson, 2013). Historical 
revisionism is frequently applied in a political context. In his seminal novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
Orwell illustrates this point quite vividly as he picks up on practices already prevalent at the time of 
his writing. He describes a Party that was continuously rewriting history to make it fit seamlessly 
with the current line. Attempts at indoctrination continue today: the collapse of the USSR and the 
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emergence of a new Russia demanded a complete rewrite of the history textbooks to reflect the 
change in ideology and identity (Zajda & Zajda, 2003). 
Academia has not been immune to pressures from corporate and financial elites. The Humboldt 
University in Berlin, with its emphasis on the production of knowledge as a benefit to society as a 
whole, may well have been an impossible ideal but, as Readings (1996) makes clear, even the 
pragmatic further education system that existed up until the 1980s has increasingly been pressurized 
into serving corporate demands. The national funding bodies are charged with demonstrating the 
relevance of university research to economic well-being: consequently studies are geared towards 
such aims. Other funding institutions are even more clearly tied to the corporate world, with a 
strong expectation of appropriate outcomes. Since receiving research funding is a pre-requisite of 
advancement within academia, the researchers are forced to comply with canons imposed from 
without. Revolutionaries might argue that, ‘the domination of the masses by elites is rooted [in …] 
the means of knowledge production’ (Rahman, 1991: 14). 
Additionally, the education system is part of the mechanism for separating out and maintaining an 
elite in many Western countries. Many of the top schools in the US and the UK charge tuition fees 
that comfortably exceed the average net salary, ensuring that social exclusion (and hence 
information asymmetry) is fortified. The dominance of Etonians, such as Prime Minister David 
Cameron, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and Mayor of London Boris Johnson, in 
contemporary British politics is well-remarked but the permeation of ex-pupils from elite schools 
goes much further. Perkin (1978) identifies their historical prevalence in ministerial positions in 
Conservative administrations, chairmanships of large companies, the judiciary, vice-chancellorships, 
BBC governorships and newspaper editorships. This is repeated in the US where Useem & Miller 
(1975: 115) contend that, ‘the stratification of educational opportunities in higher education is in 
large part a direct product of upper class dominance… the elite’s privileged access to higher 
education shapes the fortunes of the other classes.’ In their literature review, they conclude that 
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about one third of executives and directors of major corporations came from the top three American 
schools (Harvard, Princeton and Yale). (A recent survey by US News for the CEOs of the Fortune 100 
companies produced a similar statistic (Smith-Barrow, 2013)). In a complementary study, Dye and 
Pickering (1974) revealed that 55 per cent of corporate leaders and 44 per cent of government 
leaders were Ivy-League alumni. The elites are able to ensure that they maintain their grasp on the 
levers of power through a variety of techniques, not least the Ivy-League tradition of legacy 
admission where schools admit between 10 and 15 per cent of freshmen through the criteria of 
familial attendance at the same institution (The Economist, 2004).  Taken together, these statistics 
indicate that the education system is a key component in creating and maintaining power and 
informational imbalances within societies.  
3.3 Legal and Organizational Arrangements 
One way for companies to guard their knowledge is through patent protection – a process that has 
accelerated in recent years with an over six-fold increase in the number of patents granted in the US 
in the past 50 years (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2014). The know-how and information that is 
not easily captured by patent law is instead shielded from competitors and other interested parties 
by secrecy. This is an attempt to monopolize information. Basic economics tells us that monopolies 
will, if left to their own devices, produce less at higher prices, compared to a perfectly competitive 
market. This leads to an overall deadweight loss to society.   
Organizations deliberately set up structures to promote information asymmetrification. One of the 
most common and readily acknowledged is the system of classifying documents. Both the US and 
the UK have classifications such as confidential, secret and top secret (with additional country-
specific categories and subdivisions). Higher classifications demand higher level of clearance for 
those granted access with a consequent increase in rigor in the checks needed. The system of 
clearance, supported by codes of conduct, is designed so that only those ‘authorized’ are able to see 
relevant documents (Desouza and Vanapolli, 2005: 91). Yet even the highest level of clearance does 
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not mean that the holder has access to all information – rather, only those deemed to ‘need-to-
know’ will be privy, leading to compartmentalization of information. This does have some benefits – 
Desouza and Vanapolli (2005: 92) argue that it manages workload and protects ‘knowledge 
artefacts’ both in that it focuses security and, in cases of information leakage, the damage is limited. 
However, it also severely reduces the ability of individuals to fully grasp the activities of the 
organization, leading to duplication of work, ineffective coordination of collective endeavor, and 
barriers to information flow.  
The security and military services are but one example (albeit one that Desouza and Vanapolli (2005) 
suggest has lessons for information security in other organizations). Following deregulation of 
financial markets, the concept of compartmentalization became operationalized in corporations 
through the erection of Chinese walls (Green, 1989). The walls were intended to keep information 
within departments, thereby avoiding conflicts of interest. Thus, for example, since a bank’s merger 
and acquisition dealings would be valuable knowledge for traders dealing securities, a Chinese wall 
would need to be erected between the two divisions. Similarly, this partitioning arrangement would 
allow a large legal firm to represent two clients with conflicting interests. Unfortunately, as Seyhun 
(2008) makes clear, such ‘prophylactics’ are decidedly porous. The failure of Chinese walls means 
that although information asymmetry within the organization may decrease, there is a 
reinforcement of information asymmetries between that organization and its clients and other 
market players. 
Within organizations, counter-intelligence – the seeking out and reprimanding those who steal or 
misuse knowledge – is also important. Typically, as Desouza and Vanapolli (2005: 89) note, this may 
require another layer of secrecy as those investigated will frequently not know that they are under 
scrutiny. But employees will know that they could be under investigation at any time and, as 
Desouza and Vanapolli indicate, this is the principal value of counter-intelligence. Echoing Foucault’s 
(1979) use of the concept of the panopticon (which we discuss later), compliance is induced through 
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the possibility of surveillance. Clearly, popular media depictions (perhaps most notably in le Carré’s 
(1974) Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and its movie adaption) have attuned us to such operations within 
the security services, but departments fulfilling a similar function exist in many other organizations. 
More widespread use of informational asymmetries can be seen within the labor market. The 
gender gap in remuneration has been widely reported (Hausman et al. 2008; Arulampalam et al. 
2007; O’Neill, 2003) but one key factor that has being instrumental in its continuance has been the 
purposive hiding of the discrimination. This works by effectively banning, through contractual 
obligations, or strongly discouraging workers from discussing their compensation (Kulow, 2013). 
Thus women, whose wages consistently remain below those of their male counterparts, are 
unaware that they personally are being discriminated against due to a lack of comparators. Kulow 
(2013: 427) argues that the only way of eradicating this information asymmetry is to introduce 
mandatory wage disclosure laws since in Norway, where this was put in place, the gender wage gap 
narrowed markedly.  
Pay is not the only form of workplace discrimination that is entrenched through information 
asymmetry. Goldin and Rouse (2000) report on how recruitment practices for professional musicians 
changed from open audition to one where candidates performed behind a screen that rendered 
them hidden from the recruiting panel. Goldin and Rouse argue that data emerging from their study 
show that sex-biased hiring was reduced substantially. We contend that this demonstrates that 
where an information imbalance was reduced (in that in subsequent years, the jury had less 
information about the triallists, and especially about their gender), then the outcome was fairer. 
These illustrations have wider implications: where there are asymmetries, then there can often be 
results that, as a society, we may find undesirable. The solutions may come from either greater 
transparency, so that everyone has access to the relevant information, or from restricting the power 
of organizations to create a one-sided game. 
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Failure to oversee organizations that routinely deal in secrecy also has serious ramifications. The 
Pentagon’s ‘auditors admit the military cannot account for 25 percent of what it spends’ (Sirgany, 
2009) while Reuters claim that within the US Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) 
‘fudging the accounts with false entries is standard operating procedure’ (Paltrow, 2013). Although 
compartmentalization and institutional secrecy are undoubtedly justifiable by national security 
concerns, they are also partly to blame for the pathologies that arise. When financial institutions are 
similarly clandestine, wrongdoing seems inevitable. The Institute for the Works of Religion (more 
commonly known as the Vatican Bank) operated without publishing its financial statements for 125 
years (BBC, 2013), finally yielding to international pressure in 2013. In 2012, the Council of Europe 
called upon the Vatican to improve its systems, suggesting that it had not got sufficiently robust 
structures in place to counter money-laundering and the financing of terrorism (Reider-Gordon & 
Butler, 2013: 403). The bank was already infamous for a series of scandals including the enigmatic 
failure of Banco Ambrosiano or the connection with fraudster, murderer and Mafia associate 
Michele Sindona (Willey, 2013). These are but a few examples, albeit perhaps the most well-known, 
of where secretive institutions are able to avoid public accountability. There is a challenge that runs 
throughout academia and public polity as to how oversight over such institutions may be managed 
when the organizations themselves operate in a clandestine way.  
3.4 Exclusive Information Networks 
Economics is helpful in pointing out the value of private information. In financial markets, 
exploitation of material non-public information can yield super-normal profits (as we saw in the 
discussion on insider trading in section 2). The fewer people in possession of that information, the 
larger the financial gain for the holders. This leads to a pressure towards exclusive networks where 
information is shared between a select few. 
Outside financial markets, institutional structures replicate such exclusivity. Brown and Lightfoot 
(2002) discuss how email networks are used in an organization. One of the key features that they 
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report is how email correspondence is monitored by senior managers, delivering a level of 
accountability of junior staff. But one of the most treasured powers retained by the senior managers 
was their ability to step outside this documented domain: they were able to have face-to-face 
meetings with their peers where they were able to make the crucial decisions based upon wider, 
more informal levels of information. Such freedom was denied junior staff, who would always be 
dragged back into the territory of surveillance whenever they attempted to breach the boundaries. 
Of course, such recall was through ‘soft power’ – a simple request for a recap of a discussion, say – 
but the effect was always to ensure that one group was always rendered visible within the 
panopticon, while the other could choose when to make an appearance. This informal network also 
was able to function as a system for verifying the veracity of claims made and of the status of 
individuals. This ability to form networks between those sharing a common interest, and move 
outside the space occupied by the general public is, of course, normal. What this example 
demonstrates is that when that network is comprised of elites, then we have a refraction of the 
information asymmetries already in play. Thus, for example, gentleman’s clubs, Masonic lodges, 
fraternal societies, sororities and professional networks do both simply reflect like-minded groups of 
people coming together but also contain the possibility of sharing information outside the public 
purview.  
Such networks can be seen to exist within most, if not all, hierarchical organizations and societies. 
Sometimes these may become more formalized, while others remain resolutely informal. An 
example of the former might be the activities of The Consulting Association in the UK3, a secretive 
company that maintained an illegal blacklist of construction workers perceived as trouble-makers 
(such as trade-unionists and those who had raised health and safety concerns). This list could, and 
was, consulted by many of the leading construction firms in the UK. 
                                                          
3
 See, for example http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24470436, last consulted 12
th
 November 2013. 
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Other networks seem to have less formal structure but are both more insidious and more pervasive. 
Useem (1980: 54-5) points out the prevalence of interlocking directorships among corporations, that 
‘draw many of the members of the capitalist class into a single national network.’ This is reinforced 
by co-presence on ‘[b]oards of trustees of universities, hospitals, art organizations and other 
nonprofit institutions’ (1980: 55).  Some of the networks that bind are established earlier. Useem 
illustrates the importance of bonds formed through school and university but Cohen et al. (2008) 
drive home the monetary significance of these links. They find that mutual fund managers who 
attended the same degree at the same university simultaneously with a senior officer (CEO, CFO or 
chairman) of a listed company are able to deliver substantial, market-beating returns on these 
companies. Within the manager’s portfolios, the returns on the firms with which they had a 
connection exceeded the returns on non-connected firms by 7.8 per cent per annum. Cohen et al. 
show that fund managers apparently invest in these stocks more aggressively and commit larger 
amounts of capital. Although Cohen et al. do not make such a claim, one of the implications is that 
these networks are a conduit for material, non-public information. According to Fama’s (1970) 
Efficient Market Hypothesis it should be impossible for an ordinary investor to systematically beat 
the market. Cohen et al. demonstrate that the same laws do not apply to the well-connected4. 
Other networks are established and Useem (pp. 57-64) also highlights the importance of kinship and 
inheritance to maintain cohesion, continuity and exclusivity. ‘[T]he bonds of kinship within the 
corporate elite continue to facilitate the mobilization, coordination, and control of massive and 
otherwise unrelated corporate resources [while] [u]nless one is born into a corporate family (and, 
incidentally, born male), the prospects for acquiring access to the American corporate elite are 
statistically remote’ (Useem pp. 58 and 64).  
One particular type of networks that is of interest from an information point-of-view is that formed 
by secret societies. Typically, such societies have a strong hierarchical structure with higher levels 
                                                          
4
 In fact, the findings of Cohen et al. (2008) imply a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in its strong 
form. 
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granted deeper access to the society’s secrets. Joining these organizations normally requires making 
a vow of secrecy, with harsh penalties for breaking it. This may culminate in potential death threats - 
Herdt (1990: 362) gives the example where this is the case with the secret collective of the 
Mehinaku of Central Brazil and that of the organization surrounding the protection of secret 
instruments in Melenesia. Secret orders also stress the self-discipline in keeping secrets – Simmel 
(1906) argues that the collective in the Molucca Islands demanded that initiates were not to 
‘exchange a word on any subject with anybody, even in his own family’ for weeks while the 
Pythagoreans ‘prescribed silence for the novice during a number of years’ (pp. 473-475). 
Herdt (p.363) further argues that, ‘we must not underestimate the use of secrecy to create 
stratification’. Of course, the precise level of this resultant stratification is difficult to ascertain since 
secret societies, by their very nature, do not supply information on their members, activities and 
proceedings. Nevertheless, there is a limited amount of public information that indicates that elites 
are heavily involved in these clandestine organizations. Jolicoeur and Knowles (1978: 7) point out 
that many US Presidents, Senators and Congressmen were members of Masonic lodges. In the UK, 
Prince Michael of Kent is the Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Mark Master Masons (Walker, 
2012). The Italian Propaganda Due (P2) has received perhaps the most attention, including an 
investigation by a parliamentary commission. Herman and Chomsky talk about ‘the penetration of 
this massive neo-Fascist conspiracy into the military establishment, secret services, press and 
judiciary.’ (1994: 371). Rosenthal (1996: 167) points out that Berlusconi and many of his ministers 
were members and that the parliamentary investigation revealed that his media empire was 
financed by Banco Ambrosiano, which collapsed in 1982 following the murder of Roberto Calvi, the 
fugitive president of the bank. The Venerable Master of P2 (equivalent to the Worshipful Master in 
Britain) Licio Gelli was nominated for a Nobel Prize in Literature in 1996 (House, 1996). What all of 
these examples demonstrate is that such organizations have members drawn from the highest strata 
of society.   
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3.5 Surveillance and Mass Surveillance 
The data that is collected by surveillance is typically only accessible by government agencies and 
corporations and this imbalance determines the possession of power. People are not normally privy 
to the data collected on a mass scale even if this data is related to them. Perhaps one of the best 
examples is that of medical records in the UK: patients have no automatic right to see them, yet they 
can (and have been) sold to corporations that can make use of them. In many other cases, people 
are blissfully unaware of the fact that data that has been collected on them, let alone the uses to 
which it is put. 
Lyon (2007: 15), in his literature review suggests that surveillance ‘usually involves relations of 
power in which watchers are privileged’. However, much contemporary analysis of surveillance 
draws from a more nuanced model, taken from Foucault’s (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison where the watched and watchers are interlinked. Foucault draws upon Bentham’s (1787) 
putative structure of an ideal prison: the panopticon. It featured a central tower, occupied by the 
wardens, which was impossible for the prisoners to see into. By contrast, the prisoners inhabited 
largely open cells, arraigned in a ring around the tower, and were always potentially visible by any 
warder within the tower. The prisoners, recognizing that they were subject to intermittent (but 
potentially omnipresent) surveillance, assume responsibility for their own control, accepting and 
enacting discipline on and of themselves. One important aspect of this is that prisoners must be 
aware that they may be being observed and that sanctions will follow any aberration from 
prescribed behavior. If the concept of the panopticon is to be extended to a surveillance society, 
then the general population must be conscious that they may be being scrutinized. Here, then, 
whistle-blowers play a different role to the one normally ascribed to them – their function is to draw 
popular attention to the fact that the citizenry is being watched. That those who act to destabilize 
information asymmetry typically suffer severe consequences for their actions may simultaneously 
remind subjects of the cost of resistance to established power structures. Contemporary figures are 
illustrative: Julian Assange (co-founder and editor-in-chief of the whistle-blower website Wikileaks) 
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has been restricted to the confines of the Ecuadorian embassy in London; Edward Snowden (who 
leaked classified NSA documents while employed as a private contractor) has been forced to seek 
asylum in Russia; and Chelsea Manning (born Bradley Manning, who released secret diplomatic and 
military material to the public) was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Turning back to Lukes, we might 
comment that such cases demonstrate the penalties from disrupting the status quo – such actions 
may restrict those with genuine grievances and coerce them into a state of forced compliance. This 
is the social and institutional aspect that Lukes recognizes. 
The concept of the panopticon has been utilized in the context of surveillance studies before (see for 
instance, Hope, 2005 and Jonsson, 2006). As such, it initially appears to capture one aspect of 
surveillance well – that of being watched. But Foucauldian power-relations are much broader and 
more pervasive than the panopticon, extending into all aspects of society. Indeed, in contemporary 
society, the visibility of the guard-tower itself is obscured, which leads to more complex dynamics. 
Instead, citizens accept contemporary power relations on the basis that something beneficial is 
offered to them, heedless perhaps of the unseen negative. Thus users of gadgets such as mobile 
phones, Oyster cards, Wi-Fi, or the Internet perceive them to be helpful, even ‘friendly’. This 
provides a disturbing analogy to the way that the STASI (officially, the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit) conducted its information-gathering.  Here, ‘most of the information was passed 
along to the police by […] colleagues at work, friends, neighbours, lovers, even husbands and wives’ 
(Gellately, 1994: 236). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening up of the STASI archives 
revealed the extent and pervasiveness of informing: ‘all kinds of social relations including the most 
intimate ones came under stress’ (Niderhafner, 2012: 15). Thus, given the omnipresence of our 
‘friendly’ technologies and their hunger for information about us, the STASI may prove a more 
helpful metaphor for contemporary surveillance than the panopticon. 
Continuing with the theme of friendly innovations, much of the increased observation carries with it 
the promise of benefits for those being watched. In the case of security service monitoring, it is in 
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the cause of national security and personal safety. But even more mundane applications are 
resulting in the collection of considerable amounts of data. The putative move to a ‘cashless society’ 
is sold on the basis of reducing crime and the ‘black’ economy. Stores would not have to risk holding 
large amounts of cash while consumers would be freed from the burden of carrying cash and shown 
the promise of being able to have a complete record of all their expenditure. Central banks would no 
longer have to continually replenish the coins and notes in circulation (for further discussion on the 
claimed benefits see Polasik et al. (2012)).  The trend towards the ‘cashless society’ is clearly visible – 
Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006: 179) note that the use of credit and debit cards has increased relative to 
cash in recent years.  
However, the consumer’s complete record of their transactions is also held by the bank. And, as we 
have seen in the case of SWIFT (Bilefsky, 2006), where the Belgian consortium turned over massive 
amounts of ‘confidential transaction information to the Central Intelligence Agency and other 
American agencies’ in contravention of European privacy legislation, such information does not 
always stay private. Even the supposedly last bastion of privacy in finance – Swiss banking – has 
fallen. In 2010, the Swiss Parliament agreed to allow UBS to pass details of thousands of accounts 
held by Americans to the IRS (Mollenkamp et al. 2010, Delaloye et al. 2012). The greater the 
specifics of the transactions stored, the greater the potential for surveillance and the ‘cashless 
society’ is one in which all economic activities of any individual can be tracked by the authorities.   
Banking data is but a tiny fraction of the information that is being monitored. The vast amount of 
online communication data is routinely stored by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and searched by 
the authorities. Until very recently, the EC Data Retention Directive of 2009 required ISPs to hold all 
communication data5 for a period of one year (Richards, 2013: 1941; Ward & Home, 2012: 1).  Lyon 
                                                          
5
 ‘Communications data is information about a communication, not the communication itself. Communication 
data is NOT the content of any communication - the text of an email, or conversation on a telephone. 
Communications data includes the time and duration of the communication, the telephone number or email 
address which has been contacted and sometimes the location of the originator of the communication’ (Ward 
& Home, 2012: 7). Email is the focus of our discussion here but it is worthy of note that this directive also 
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(2007: 42-43) explores how this information is scrutinized through the use of the FBI’s Carnivore 
system that ‘sniffs’ email messages and the international (and even more powerful) ‘Echelon’ 
information-gathering system. Further notice of the degree of surveillance was given by Snowden’s 
revelations of the scope of the NSA’s PRISM data-mining program – which also examined the 
content of electronic communications. One possible solution to such intrusion might initially appear 
to be encryption of correspondence – but that carries its own risk. Not only do ‘sniffer’ programs 
deliberately target such communications, but its use brings further attention from the security 
services. One colleague from the UK reports that, following encryption of his emails, he was visited 
by a policeman who, despite not proffering a warrant, asked him to decrypt the communications for 
the officer’s inspection.     
Yet even the Internet that we use in our everyday lives is likely to soon be overtaken in size by the 
Internet of Things (Ashton, 2009; Atzori et al. 2010). It uses Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology to capture and track the whereabouts of manufactured objects with the ultimate ideal of 
tracking ‘everything’ world-wide within a single global network based upon the existing Internet 
(Albrecht & Mcintyre, 2005: 24-25). Effectively, each object has its own unique identity (or website) 
and can communicate with manufacturers, distributors, suppliers and even with other objects. RFID 
technology further replaces and intensifies that of barcodes (in that the products no longer need to 
be presented for scanning) and produces colossal amounts of data – even by 2006 Walmart’s  
centralized database stored more than 500 terabytes of information (Petrovic & Hamilton, 2006, p. 
133); double that of the Internet at the time (Hays, 2004). The data has revolutionized Walmart’s 
supply chain, making it the most efficient of US supermarkets (Gilchrist et al., 2012) but it also has 
created, through combining with data from loyalty cards, considerable knowledge about customers 
which can be used for commercial purposes or shared with the authorities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
covers telephone communications and this is mirrored in the US by the NSA’s MAINWAY program which, it is 
estimated, holds data on telephone calls that runs into the trillions. 
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The technology has spread beyond inanimate things. Micro-chipping of pets has become well-
established and recently (2012) the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of 
RFID for the tracking of livestock, despite widespread concerns about the carcinogenic properties of 
the chips in animals (see Blanchard et al. 1999; Elcock et al. 2001; and le Calvez et al. 2006 for 
research on laboratory rodents, Carminato et al. 2011 for cats, and Vasellari et al. 2006 for dogs). In 
2004, the FDA also approved specific microtransponder systems as ‘medical devices’ suitable (and 
permissible) for implantation in humans (Foster & Jaeger, 2008: 45). The technology potentially 
allows the tracking of the movement of those implanted, together with a record of the similarly 
chipped ‘things’ with which they interact.  Unsurprisingly, such moves sparked dissent. Legislatures 
in California, Wisconsin and North Dakota created laws that explicitly prevented forced or coerced 
human implantation (Albrecht, 2007) while some religious groups have seen the technology as 
imprinting ‘the mark of the beast’. More commonly, RFID chips are worn and a burgeoning market 
has been created and aggressively extended (Albrecht & Mcintyre, 2005). The most visible 
implementation is perhaps that of tagging schoolchildren to monitor attendance (upon which, in 
many American states, the school’s income is dependent) (Lyon, 2007: 17; Kravets, 2012). Here, too, 
there has been considerable resistance with lawsuits launched (again including ones referring to ‘the 
mark of the beast’). Further technological advances suggest that surveillance will not even require 
such awareness of the monitoring equipment: ‘smart dust’ seemingly offers the potential of 
embedding microscopic sensors everywhere, creating and distributing information about people and 
things (Lohr, 2010; Kahn et al. 1999).  
Mobile phones offer a rich source of surveillance potential. European legislation historically required 
mobile phone operators to keep records of all communications for one year6 while in the US the 
MAINWAY is the ‘largest database ever assembled in the world’ with the aim to capture details ‘of 
                                                          
6
 This was found by the European Court of Justice to be incompatible with the rights to private life (White, 
2014), although subsequently the UK at least has reintroduced legislation that partially bypasses the 
restrictions (Wintour, Mason & Ball, 2014).  
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every call ever made’ (Cauley, 2006).7 As phones become more sophisticated, they become more 
vulnerable. The NSA had found a way of using iPhones as remote eavesdropping devices without the 
owner’s knowledge (CBS/AP 2013). The cameras embedded in smartphones offer similar spying 
opportunities. Marx (2006) points out that in Japan, phones must emit a sound before a photograph 
is taken – however this useful warning has not been widely adopted. Smartphones also carry GPS 
transponders which can be used to track the position of the phone (and by implication, its owner). 
Governments and companies are alive to this possibility – the Beijing authorities have considered 
plans for a phone tracking system that would cover 17 million people (Lewis, 2011), enabling them 
to crush protests. But even this seems dwarfed by the recent revelations that the NSA captures 200 
million SMS texts a day (Ball, 2014). 
Similarly, CCTV has become ubiquitous ostensibly with a promise of reducing public disorder 
although, as Monahan’s (2006) literature review reveals, there was no evidence that it deterred 
violent crime (although it did have some impact on vehicular and traffic offences). Recent estimates 
by the British Security Industry Association put the number in the UK at up to 5.9 million – or one 
camera for every eleven people (Barrett, 2013). Cameras can be integrated with facial recognition 
technology to identify subjects. Tesco is planning to use such a combination to target consumers 
with relevant advertising at petrol stations (Warman, 2013) – while governmental authorities (such 
as the US Department of Homeland Security) have been testing its efficiency in public places (DHS, 
2012). The pervasiveness of cameras scanning public spaces seems to be on the cusp of extension to 
private, personal space. The X-Box One caused a furor when it was announced that its attached 
camera would be ‘always on, always watching’ (Andrews, 2013). Yet there is little attention paid to 
the fact that all laptops and PCs with webcams are also always potentially on. The Washington Post 
                                                          
7
 As we write this paper, there is a continuing legal battle as to the legitimacy of the government’s collection of 
telephone data. A federal judge in December 2013 ruled that the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data 
was ‘almost certainly unconstitutional’, although the government is appealing the decision (Nakashima & 
Marimow, 2013; Horwitz, 2014). The latest position appears to be that the President and the US Senate are 
coming close to agreement on a bill that sets out the terms under which the NSA can collect data (Bennett & 
Phelps 2014). 
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reports that one of the techniques used by the FBI to monitor suspects is the remote activation of 
the computer camera, while disguising its use by not illuminating the camera-on light (Timberg & 
Nakashima, 2013). Ackerman & Ball (2014) report that GCHQ intercepted the communications of 1.8 
million Yahoo webcam users in one six-month spell, including between 3 and 11 per cent that 
contained ‘undesirable nudity’. 
The latest Samsung Smart TV range comes with camera, Internet connection, face recognition, voice 
and gesture control. Although at the moment it is unlikely that anyone is watching, Orwell’s 
(1949/1984) prediction is eerily prescient: 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound Winston made, 
above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he 
remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen 
as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being 
watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police 
plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. (p.158). 
We shall return to the Foucauldian implications later. But for now, we would like to point the 
interested reader to the multiplicity of other intrusive technologies that we have skipped over for 
reasons of space. These might include the ability to be tracked while using public transport through 
the use of smart tickets such as OysterCard, plans to install transponders in all manufactured 
vehicles in Europe by October 2015 (Beckford, 2014), smart meters that monitor electricity use (Ray, 
2012), old-fashioned phone hacking and tapping, the monitoring of refuse in domestic rubbish bins, 
the use of commercial waste bins to provide Wi-Fi hotspots (that also track the movement of 
subscribers) (Cookson, 2013) , and, perhaps most important of all, DNA databases. In the UK, in 
2005, this was estimated to hold biometric data on 3.45 million individuals (Lyon, 2007: 113). The 
above examples, we believe, demonstrate the omnipresence of surveillance technologies in our 
everyday lives and the impetus for their further intensification. 
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4. Leaving and dealing with the outcomes of surveillance and information 
asymmetries 
Richards (2013: 1935) argues that ‘surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil 
liberties’ as well as stifle creativity and restrain intellectual activities. Evidence from where the 
extent of surveillance has been unmasked (such as Libya under Gadhafi, Syria, China, Burma and Iran 
– see Villasenor, 2011) shows the potential for intrusive data collection. Villasenor documents how 
authoritarian governments are able to monitor Internet usage, track mobile telephones and record 
conversations, access and read emails. He demonstrates that much of the equipment for such 
surveillance is sourced from developed countries and the latter revelations stemming from Snowden 
where such technologies were deployed against citizens in the West would have come as no 
surprise.  
The information gathered delivers the holders increased power to persuade. This might, at first 
blanche, appear harmless or even relatively benign, as in the case of targeted marketing or crime-
fighting. But the same technologies are just as easily deployed to serve state coercion, blackmail or 
discrimination, as Richards (2013) warns. But the two are not as distinct as first seems: as far back as 
the 1940s, extant ‘big’ data in the form of the ‘census records by the American, Canadian, and 
German governments during the Second World War [were used] to identify citizens to relocate to 
the Japanese internment camps in North America and the concentration camps in Europe.’  Richards 
(2013: 1956) (see also Lyon, 2007: 30). Even targeted marketing seems to creep beyond the original, 
beneficial remit: consumers, once linked to their spending patterns and implied wealth (via store 
cards and Internet activity), are graded by a system of ‘social sorting’ and selected. The careful 
identification of ‘appropriate’ target groups means that some are offered discounts and benefits 
while others are steered in the opposite direction. Perhaps the most explicit example is in banks – 
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where the affluent are offered funds with the lowest fees and often the highest returns, while those 
without substantial wealth get more expensive, poorer performing products. 
Sometimes the screen is lifted and we get an inkling of the extent to which we are being surveyed. 
Whistle-blowers, such as Assange, Snowden or Manning, have brought into the public domain 
evidence of how government intelligence agencies operate. The reaction to such disclosure has been 
mixed, and the discussion about surveillance is often (perhaps deliberately) drowned in angry 
debate about the motivations and actions of the whistle-blowers compared to the necessity of 
keeping the state safe. This effect has often been remarked upon:  Zimbardo (2007: 227) argues that 
‘alleged threats to national security have frightened citizens into willingly sacrificing their basic civil 
rights to gain an illusion of security’.  Lyon and Heggarty (2012) posit that this took on a new 
intensity following 9/11, with greater surveillance in the name of security overriding the principle of 
the rule of law. Lyon (2007: 29) sees this as potentially a new, permanent state: ‘It is hard to see 
when a ‘war on terror’ might end […] War means crisis and crisis means special measures.’ Since 
there is no ‘visible’ enemy that can be vanquished, there is no means of ‘winning’ the war, and thus 
the special measures continue indefinitely. 
National security aside, surveillance has been well recognized within the organizational literature. 
Employers have the possibilities of monitoring the performance, behavior and personal 
characteristics of workers through a range of technologies. These include clocking-in, drug-, medical- 
and psychometric-testing, GPS tracking, CCTV, Internet, email and telephone monitoring, mystery 
shopping, swipe cards, biometrics and lie-detector tests (Ball, 2010).  Sewell and Barker (2006) point 
out that the literature on organizational surveillance has become polarized, with two distinct 
perspectives co-existent. On one side, proponents list the potential advantages that include 
productivity improvements, beneficial disciplinary effects with the reduction of disruptive behavior 
and theft, as well as the mitigation of legal risks. Against this, opponents point out that such systems 
may meet worker resistance and attempts to nose out the ‘blind spots’. Unfettered, they reduce 
worker autonomy and the ability to exercise discretion as well as undermining their civil rights.  
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Surveillance systems do not always work in the way intended. Ball (2010: 99) points out that workers 
are sometimes able to appropriate ‘the means of surveillance to stare back at their employers’. In 
such cases, systems designed to fortify the power of the leaders are instead used to undermine 
them.  Scrutiny of others is not restricted to the weak: recent revelations have revealed the extent of 
NSA eavesdropping on the German Chancellor (Oltermann 2014), severely undermining relations 
between Germany and the US. The aim here may not (at least immediately) be the disciplining of 
errant subjects, but the collection of information (Smith-Spark 2013). Intelligence agencies 
worldwide all understand the power that comes from holding better information than your counter-
party. 
Readers will have their own opinions about the above technologies and their impact in the 
workplace. However, even systems that initially appear designed to assist workers can become 
seriously detrimental. Collinson (1999) reports on some of the causes of the Pipa Alpha North Sea 
oil-rig disaster that claimed the lives of 167 people. His paper highlights how a system that was 
designed to promote a safety culture by monitoring accidents, when combined with performance 
management, resulted in ‘defensive practices’ on the part of workers. Since accidents that were 
reported resulted in sanctions, workers deliberately left them unreported or tried to diminish their 
importance. In this way, the accident statistics were consistent with an ideal of good practice, but 
seriously under-represented the risks on the rig. Hoskin (1996) points out that this is inevitable – any 
measure that can become a target, will do so, and in so doing, lose any efficacy as a measure.  
The behavior that Collinson reported has been picked up by several other studies. Knights and 
Willmott (1985) show how specific behavior resistant to the desired outcomes of the systems 
planners is generated. Knights and McCabe (2000) take this further in demonstrating the paths to 
resistance that remain open even in a more totalizing management regime, such as TQM at a bank. 
Here, workers found that they were faced with the choice of reporting cash discrepancies correctly, 
risking disciplinary action, or ‘fiddling’ the cash and avoiding repercussions. Knights and McCabe 
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suggest that the positive side of this is that even in the face of oppressive regimes, workers are still 
able to retain some autonomy. Also, as Alferoff and Knights (2008) demonstrate, where competing 
targets are used, workers and managers find space to negotiate the interpretation of the statistics 
produced by surveillance systems. Bain and Taylor (2000) insist that the metaphor of the panopticon 
is considerably overstated – taking the example of call-centers where intrusive monitoring is 
widespread, they describe how workers are able to use tactics to defeat observation. These include: 
watching the observer to see where scrutiny is being directed; leaving the line open after a client has 
hung up to give an impression that they are still occupied; pretending to be talking to clients on the 
telephone; and providing minimal and misleading responses to customers (see also Ball, 2010).   
Arguably, in the examples of the oil-rig, the bank and the call-centers above, the effects may be due 
to deficiencies of the surveillance systems. In that, they mirror problems of less technologically 
advanced control regimes. However, we would suggest that technological progress has been and will 
be unable to mitigate some of the negative unintended consequences that arise. This can be 
explained in at least two ways. First, the act of being observed engenders a range of (typically 
negative) psychological reactions and secondly, as Knights and Willmott (1985) point out, power and 
resistance are intertwined.    
In a report on the reactions to electronic monitoring systems, Henderson et al. (1998) show that 
individuals placed under scrutiny experienced increases in both heart rate and blood pressure, 
indicating higher stress levels. Yet, they also noted that there was no increase in performance among 
their test subjects.  In a review of the literature, Stanton (2000: 101) corroborates the finding that 
performance monitoring can be a stressor. A survey of employees of AT&T by Smith et al. (1992: 17) 
found that electronically monitored workers ‘perceived their working conditions as more stressful, 
and reported higher levels of job boredom, psychological tension, anxiety, depression, anger, health 
complaints and fatigue’. They classify the complaints that employees registered into 
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musculoskeletal, psychological and psychosomatic, including problems such as shoulder stiffness and 
soreness, back pain, headaches and exhaustion. 
In terms of performance, Stanton (2000) and Aiello and Svec (1993) report that while performance 
on simple tasks may be enhanced by observation, its effect on more complex work and operations 
demanding learning is detrimental. However, Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) found that even 
relatively simple tasks, such as comparing database records, can be impaired by electronic 
monitoring.  A key driver here is, they argue, the perception of personal control that workers have 
over their environment. Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) document that workers contentment with a 
monitoring system influences job satisfaction and, in turn, this affects employee turnover. Overall, 
then, the picture given is that monitoring gives rise to a series of unintended effects. 
Workers may show resistance to being placed under surveillance in line with the theory of 
psychological reactance suggested by Brehm (1972) and Brehm & Brehm (1981). Reactance theory 
suggests that individuals, when their personal freedom is restricted, will act in ways that attempt to 
restore their autonomy. The more severe the threat, the more intense the reaction.  In situations 
where monitoring is seen as impinging on freedom, then the reaction is likely to be a strike against 
the authority imposing it. Lawrence and Robinson (2007) make the link between the lack of 
workplace autonomy and resistance expressed as deviance. They point out that although deviant 
acts might be regarded as counter-productive to the organization, workers may find that they 
restore their freedom and self-respect. Their article gives examples of such behavior which may 
include ‘vandalism, theft, or sabotage’ aimed at the organization and ‘gossip, scapegoating, or 
physical assault’ towards individuals (p.385). Similarly, Jensen and Raver (2012) note that self-
management can promote favorable attitudes towards the employer. However, if managers do not 
relinquish control, and continue to monitor workers in such a self-management environment, 
counterproductive work behavior ensues.  
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Such detrimental psychological effects are not just inflicted upon the disempowered but also upon 
those who enact the systems. The notorious Stanford prison experiments demonstrated how, in less 
than a week, students could wholeheartedly adopt roles of prisoners and guards, and take it to 
almost mediaeval levels of punishment (Zimbardo, 2007), with guards becoming sadistic and 
prisoners ‘zombie-like in their mindless compliance, obeying absurd orders’ (p 181). The surveillance 
society differs in the lack of personal immediacy but the separation out of ‘guards’ and ‘prisoners’ 
analogy seems to hold. And, in organizations where accountability only flows one way, we should 
not be surprised if we see similarly dysfunctional behavior emerging. From a psychoanalytical 
perspective, Stein & Pinto (2011) illustrate how the ‘dark side’ of managerial groups can emerge. 
Taking this analogy to a political arena, one might suggest that it is inevitable that power will 
corrupt. 
The obvious question that then emerges is quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who watches the 
watchmen?) The recent consternation sparked by the Snowden revelations was, in part, that the 
answer was unclear. Even mature democracies, with centuries of spying under their belts, seemed to 
be incapable of working out what the bounds of surveillance of their citizens could, or should, be. 
Nor indeed, what structures should be in place to oversee security operatives and the information 
stored, not least when lines of accountability seemed to have been thoroughly shattered as private 
companies have been increasingly employed to collect, analyze and keep the data. There has been 
disquiet about the seemingly continuous new breaches of hitherto sacrosanct areas of privacy, both 
from a range of single issue groups, such as Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and 
Numbering (Caspian), to broader privacy campaigners such as Privacy International and the 
Electronic Privacy Information Centre, and many politicians of different stripes. However, the 
encroachments are on so many fronts, and the opposition so fragmented, that although there may 
be the occasional small victory, there appears little prospect of reversing the general trend.  These 
prospects have never looked positive: Rule (1973: 42) pointed out that even at the time of his 
writing the impetus was for ‘more and more effective forms of mass surveillance and control.’ 
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Similarly, Dandeker (1990) argued that the technological tools necessary for surveillance to be 
effective as a means of administrative power continue, and will continue, to develop.   
One potential, and possibly democratic, move would be to ensure that knowledge is spread more 
equally and transparently. Simmel (1906: 447-8) suggested that, ‘If there were such a thing as 
complete reciprocal transparency, the relationships of human beings to each other would be 
modified in a quite unimaginable fashion.’ We concur. Imagine a cashless society in which all 
transactions are recorded, and which are easily observable by any member of this society. Engaging 
in criminal activities would be futile since any proceeds would become instantly visible to everyone. 
Discrimination by employers at the workplace would be similarly rendered impossible – the evidence 
of systematic prejudice in wages would swiftly be recognized. Exploitative practices by corporations 
would no longer be shielded by commercial confidentiality and politicians would be stripped of their 
power to drag their nations into wars under false pretenses. A secret service would become a 
contradiction in terms, as a lack of secrets would render it obsolete. While such a society has a 
certain appeal, the flip side is that privacy has effectively been abandoned. Yet in our current society 
we are seeing a similar erosion of privacy. Only it is not our peers that pry on us but unaccountable 
government agencies and corporations. This leaves us with two issues. The first is that we should, as 
a demos, be able to determine how much privacy we keep and how much surveillance we suffer. 
And, if we are to curtail our rights to privacy, we should determine who holds that information and 
for what purpose – whether it be available to all or to a select few. 
The path through this thicket is complicated. While we do have the right to vote, and thus to choose 
at least some of our politicians and the policies that they stand for, our rights become much more 
diffuse with organizations. Corporations, quangos and partnerships are substantially less democratic 
and frequently ignore objections of stakeholders. We have already discussed how they create 
information asymmetries in their HRM systems and how they collect and protect business 
intelligence. It is worth noting that companies also collect vast amounts of information on their 
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customers through, for example, loyalty cards and those who are unwilling to surrender their privacy 
for a handful of vouchers lose out. Theoretically, abuses of surveillance and information asymmetry 
can be restricted through regulation since organizations are expected to comply with the law of the 
land where they operate. However, laws are enacted by politicians, and they seem to have an 
inherent conflict of interest since they can be the beneficiaries of information asymmetries created. 
There is considerable evidence that law enforcement and security agencies routinely work with 
corporations to sift data collected, even without a warrant (Albrecht, 2001). Such relationships can 
be formalized – the InfraGard program links the FBI with private sector ‘partners’ to provide the 
means of coordinating access to a range of databases. Additionally, political oversight is further 
diminished when corporations are involved in the drafting of the laws that pertain to them. It may 
be that a greater separation between the state and corporations could be enforced by the 
requirement of a warrant to access any data external to a government agency, such as customer 
records. In that way, some of the conflict of interest would be diminished and better regulation 
could follow. 
It is unlikely that there will be change emerging from corporations themselves. Shareholders are 
seen as the primary means of holding the managers of corporations to account, yet shareholder 
power has never been strong and the concentration of ownership has done little to alleviate this 
(Davis, 2009). And, of course, as we outlined earlier, corporations see value in collecting information 
that is not held by their competitors. Advances in customer relationship management require 
greater amounts of data about clients in order to tailor products and increase marketing 
effectiveness. Once again, a conflict of interest militates against change. Since higher earnings and 
dividends may be dependent on large amounts of private information, it is unlikely that any changes 
will be instigated by either shareholders or managers. 
From the above, it seems apparent the increasing shareholder power would not be a solution. 
Indeed, Gaverta and Cornwall (2008: 180-1) suggest that simply developing participatory processes 
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carries ‘the danger … that existing power relations may simply be reinforced, without leading to 
substantive changes in policies or structures which perpetuate the problems being addressed.’ More 
generally, knowledge that is sorted within a pyramid of privilege will always carry the risk that power 
structures will endure – and this is a further question that will need addressing. Orwell (1949/1984: 
321) pointedly remarks, ‘In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on the basis of 
poverty and ignorance.’  While here we do not delve deeply into the issues surrounding the 
economic dominance by elites, we cannot avoid consideration of the implication what could be 
considered the ‘orchestrated ignorance and poverty’ of society, or as (Mirowski 2013: 227) puts it, 
the deliberate fostering of agnotology. The evidence is clear: political and commercial leaders 
purposefully withhold information from the rest of society – information that is currently being 
gathered on an unprecedented scale. We should not be surprised with such developments as 
information asymmetrification provides a foundation on which the existence of elites is built and 
possibilities of strengthening that asymmetry will be enthusiastically sought. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of the issues of power and information 
imbalances in contemporary life. We argue that the differentials created should not be merely seen 
as a passive fact – rather information asymmetrification is an active and ongoing process. Our paper 
uses a multi-disciplinary approach to elucidate the relationship between such asymmetrification and 
how power is ineluctably interrelated to ensuing imbalances. The approach integrates themes 
running through different fields of the social sciences, thus providing a broader perspective than that 
delivered by any single discipline. More specifically, we try to unite the theoretical construct of 
asymmetric information from the field of economics with the political and social view of power 
developed by Lukes (1974). Lukes’ approach enables us to explicate that which fails to manifest, 
while economics is helpful in comprehending the material value of knowledge.  
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According to Lukes, those in power will attempt to align the desires and preferences of wider society 
with their own objectives. Mass media and the education system are important tools in this 
enterprise. Lukes further refines this in his three-dimensional view of power, where he identifies the 
socially structured actions of institutions as crucial to maintaining the status quo. Partly, this works 
through ‘non-decisions’ of individuals who find that the avenues of opposition to existing power and 
information structures are scarce, and acts of resistance are hazardous due to the existing 
institutional structure.  Economics, on the other hand, delivers insights into the value of private 
information to the few and the detrimental consequences of not sharing this knowledge with the 
many. As this paper demonstrates, this discipline has recognized the deleterious effects of 
information asymmetry for both decision-making and for capital markets, with consequences for 
societal well-being. Economics also helps to explain why we have legal restrictions on information 
flow imposed within organizations and across society, as well as why exclusive networks are created 
and maintained. We contend that since power is dependent upon the control of information, and 
vice versa, a deeper understanding of the networks in play demands consideration of both elements. 
Within this theoretical scaffolding, we demonstrated how key technologies and techniques have 
been, and continue to be, employed to deepen and widen the information gap. Unsurprisingly, we 
note that there are marked differences between those who inhabit the opposite banks – we are 
witnessing an entrenchment of power and information within a small, exclusive group on one side 
while the general population bears the weight of evermore intrusive surveillance. Often, this 
surveillance is not acknowledged as such, since much of it is conducted though technologies that 
hide behind a veneer of helpfulness and friendship.  
Societies should carefully consider, given how heavily costs to all outweigh the private benefits to 
the powerful, how much information should be collected and who should have access to it. As a 
minimum, we need to consider the level of democratic oversight and institutional accountability 
over data collection, handling, processing and dissemination. Beyond that, members of society 
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should be able to voice their preferences with regards to privacy and information access. Although 
technology activists argue that information wants to be free (Brand 1987: 202), we contend that the 
freedom to collect information has been at the expense of individual freedom of the general public.  
Although questions of freedom are relevant to everyone, we are conscious of our role as academics 
in framing aspects of the debate. We would suggest that when considering such issues, future 
research should draw insights from across the social sciences and beyond. Our approach has drawn 
insights from political theory, sociology, psychology, economics, finance, technology studies and 
media and communications – but these are not the only avenues that could be explored. We believe 
that the subject is so complex that it can only be elucidated by intersecting several disciplines.   
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